On NSA-Proof Security
@KimZetter We need to distinguish between "proof against NSA dragnet", "proof against NSA PRISM", and "proof against NSA TAO". @runasand — zooko (@zooko) September 17, 2014 For a long time, “military grade encryption” has been a red flag for snake oil, over-hyped, under-performing garbage, so much so that it’s become a punchline. Anytime that phrase is seen, it’s assumed that the product is a joke – quite possibly doing more harm than good.
Read more…A backdoor by any other name…
Yesterday James B. Comey, the Director of the FBI continued the propaganda campaign against encryption with a fresh batch of lies and misdirection. The FBI has been pushing to add backdoors to cryptosystems around the world – no matter how many people they put at risk in the process. Starting in the 1990’s, the FBI has been at the forefront of trying to make their job easier by endangering the world.
Read more…The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
E-Mail, the venerable old standard for internet text messages, dating back to the early 1980s – and back to the early 1970s in other forms, has long been the “killer app” of the internet. While so many companies try to make the next great thing that’ll capture users around the world – none of these compare to the success of e-mail. It is likely the single most entrenched application-layer protocol used today.
Read more…On Opportunistic Encryption
Opportunistic encryption has become quite a hot topic recently, and blew up in a big way thanks to an Internet Draft that was published on February 14th for what amounts to sanctioned man-in-the-middle. Privacy advocates were quickly up in arms – but it’s not that simple (see here). As pointed out by Brad Hill, this isn’t about HTTPS traffic, but HTTP traffic using unauthenticated TLS; thanks to poor wording in the document, it’s easy to miss that fact if you just skim it.
Read more…Worried about the NSA? Try AES-512!
…or, The Cost of Wild Speculation. “We need to boost our security – I think the NSA has broken everything we use. AES-256 is too weak, I don’t trust it. Find a way to implement AES-512.” Double-AES-256! It’d be easy, and double encrypting has never bitten us before. So, let’s write some code! def encrypt(msg, iv, key) return e(e(msg, iv, key.slice(0..31)), iv, key.slice(32..63)) end def decrypt(cipher, iv, key) return d(d(cipher, iv, key.
Read more…Crypto, the NSA, and Broken Trust
Even as a child I was fascinated by cryptography – and often left the local librarians with puzzled looks thanks to the books I would check out. It’s so elegantly simple, and yet massively complex. There is one very unusual property of crypto though – it’s not about math or modes, it’s about trust. Cryptography, especially as used today, has the most wonderful dichotomy of trust; on one hand crypto, by its very nature, is used in situations lacking trust.
Read more…Hash Storage: Make Attackers Work
So you hash your passwords? Good. Do you salt? That’s good. Do you use a strong hashing algorithm (PBKDF2/bcrypt/scrypt)? Great! But how do you store the hashes? What happens when you get hit with a SQL injection attack? I’m a big believer in defense in-depth – not that marketing garbage about stacking layers of blinky-light boxes, but using techniques to add extra work for an attacker. You might not be able to stop every attack, but the more work they have to do, the better the odds they won’t get everything they want.
Read more…OPSEC, The NSA, and You
It’s been two weeks since news broke about the NSA collecting massive amounts of data from Verizon; and likely everybody else. There’s also PRISM – whatever the hell that is – it seems there’s no agreement on that, and I doubt there will be anytime soon. What really matters here though, is we have proof that people are watching – and if it’s happening in the US, it’s probably happening everywhere else.
Read more…Password Hashing: No Silver Bullets
In the dark days of the web, if a service hashed your password instead of storing it in plain text, they were doing good. As sites were hacked, and credentials stolen, a silver bullet emerged: always hash and salt passwords when storing them. Many, many services were built with this design – LivingSocial is a great example. SHA1 hashing with a 40 byte salt – once upon a time, that was considered reasonable protection.
Read more…First, Do No Harm: Developers & Bad APIs
Primum non nocere (first, do no harm) – an iconic phrase in modern medicine, yet also applicable to many other fields. This is something I wish more people would think about, developers especially – and primarily when writing new APIs. In general, developers don’t have an impressive history with security – quite frankly, developers suck. Seeing as I consider myself a developer, that’s painful to admit. Chris Andrè Dale posted an interesting article some time ago that got me thinking: Why it’s easy being a hacker: A SQL injection case study – Chris pointed out the problems with educational material that developers are using, and just how bad the examples are.
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About Me
Security researcher, engineer and software developer with more than 20 years of experience.
Work: I primarily focus on application security, usable security, secure communications, and cryptography. I build and lead strong and dynamic teams, who cover all facets of security and privacy.
Writing: I write about my research, security in general, development and software design, and leadership through my blog, essays, and various publications. I also engage in some creating writing when I can.
Photography: I am a purist fine art photographer, working primarily in black & white, and focused on sharing new perspectives of the world. Limited edition prints of my work are available on my online gallery. I also have a background in photojournalism, and volunteer in this field when I can.