(See here for another issue discovered during this research; Updates over HTTP & Command Execution.)
PL/SQL Developer by Allround Automations has an option to store the user’s logon history with passwords – the passwords are encrypted with a proprietary algorithm. At this point, you should know how this is going to go.
For those that don’t know, PL/SQL Developer is a tool for developers and database administrators to access Oracle – an essential tool in many enterprise environments. Instead of using something that provides some actual security like DPAPI (which itself is far from perfect, as we saw with the UPEK fiasco), they opted to use a proprietary “encryption” algorithm to protect these passwords – making it trivial to recover the passwords for any attacker that can access the preferences file(s).
Some time ago I asked the vendor about the security of the password storage – they are aware of the lack of security, but don’t make it clear to their customers.
From: Allround Automations Support [email@example.com]
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2015 12:37 PM
To: Adam Caudill
Subject: RE: PL/SQL Developer - Password Storage
The encryption is proprietary. If a user copies the config file,
the passwords are also copied, so it's not secure.
Allround Automations (http://www.allroundautomations.com)
The fact that they are aware that it isn’t secure, yet this issue has existed for years – nor made it clear to users what they are risking by activating the option is extremely disappointing. Vendors have a responsibility to protect customer information, and broken features like this completely ignore that.
The encryption algorithm is quite simple, primarily consisting of a bit shift and xor – let’s take a closer look at how it works. The ciphertext produced looks like this:
The first group of four digits (
2736) is the key – it’s generated based on the system uptime, producing an integer between 0 and 999, then 2,000 is added. This means that the key is has 1,000 possible values, or just under 10 bits. Of course, when you store the key with the encrypted data – key size really doesn’t matter.
After the key at the beginning, each group of four digits represents one byte – this simple code is all that’s needed to encrypt:
for (int i = 0; i < plaintext.Length; i++)
var mask = plaintext[i] << 4;
var n = (mask ^ (key + (i + 1)*10)) + 1000;
ret += Convert.ToString(n).PadLeft(4, '0');
When you encrypt the string
user/password@server, here’s what the encrypted data breaks down to:
The login information is stored in an INI-like file called
user.prefs – under the headings of
[CurrentConnections]; storage of passwords is an option that is turned off by default, though storage of history is turned on by default. All data stored in these sections is encrypted using this method, so the presence of data in these sections does not necessarily mean that passwords are present.
These files can be stored in a number of locations (the latter are more common with older versions of the application):
C:\Program Files\PLSQL Developer\Preferences\<username>\
C:\Program Files (x86)\PLSQL Developer\Preferences\<username>\
The data format for the two sections is somewhat different, in
[LogonHistory], the data is in the following format:
[CurrentConnections], the format is
<username>,<password>,<server>,,,; the login can also be stored in
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\PLSQL Developer\PLS-Recovery\*.cfg, in this same format.
This encryption method is also used in other files, though in less predictable locations.
The Proof of Concept
We have released a proof of concept tool to decrypt these logins, and as is typical, it’s open source. Simply run the executable from the command line, and it will search for the preference files and print any information it’s able to retrieve.
PL/SQL Developer: Password 'Decrypter'
Copyright 2016 Adam Caudill & Brandon Wilson
v184.108.40.206 - https://github.com/adamcaudill/PLSQLDevPass
Found 1 config files...
You can also pass in the name of a remote machine, and it will attempt to use the administrative (
Special thanks to my frequent research partner, Brandon Wilson, for his help with this project.